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1
Human populations have survived cycles of 
growth and decline in their numbers through-
out history. Up until the late 1800s, changes 
in death and migration rates were the main 
forces behind fluctuations in population size 
all around the world, after which declining 
birth rates became a third important factor. 
Depopulation confronted many parts of 
Europe, such as in the territory of today’s 
Republic of Ireland. Its population declined 
from 6.5M in 1841 to 5.1M within ten years 
during the “Great Famine,” and was followed 
by continued losses, with the population bot-
toming out at 2.8M in 1961 (McCarthy, 1961). 
While this came with massive disruptions to 
society at the time, it did not prevent the Irish 
population from recovering to a degree, and 
later becoming a textbook example of develop-
mental success. 
In historical context, the 
population decline now in Serbia 
and other Southeastern European 
countries is not unprecedented, 
nor does it necessarily imply 
doom for the future. 
In this introductory section we will put these 
concerns in a global demographic and histori-
cal perspective.
There may even have been instances in our 
early history when homo sapiens were close 
to extinction. Three main threats directly 
affected human mortality in historical context: 
food shortages, diseases, and conflict. When 
the Neolithic revolution some 12000 years 
ago led to more bountiful and stable food 
supplies, this resulted in a marked increase 
in the human population. But it is estimated 
that up until 1500 the world population stayed 
well under 500M. In the mid-14th century, 
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much shorter period. Despite generally high 
fertility rates of the time, the mortality rates, 
particularly among children, kept population 
growth to a relatively slower pace than it 
could have reached. The recurrent pandemics 
shown in Table 1 were only one reason for this 
high level of mortality, with the main causes 
lying in chronic conditions of malnutrition and 
the high prevalence of common infectious 
diseases. By 1850, life expectancy was quite 
consistent across Europe at around 40 years, 
with only minor regional differences. Today, 
newborn children in Europe can expect to live 
more than twice that number of years.
1331-1351 Bubonic Plague 35-200 M
1520 Smallpox 56 M
17th Century Plague Outbreaks 3 M
1817-1923 Cholera Outbreaks 1 M
1855 The “Third Plague” 12 M
1889-90 “Russian Flu” 1 M
1918-19 “Spanish Flu” 40-50 M
1957-58 “Asian Flu” 1.1 M
1968-70 “Hongkong Flu” 1 M
1991-present HIV/AIDS 25-35 M
2002-3 SARS 770
2009-10 “Swine Flu” 200 K
2012-present MERS 850+
2014-16 Ebola 11.2 K
2019-by Oct 2020 COVID-19 above 1 M 
Table 1.
Summary of most important pandemics since 1300 
Death estimates based on various sources as given by 
LePan (2020) and World Health Organization (2020) 

M-Millions, K-Thousands
the total world population actually declined; 
the bubonic plague ended an unprecedented 
number of lives – estimates range from 35 
to 200M people died from contracting the 
plague (see Table 1). It took more than 100 
years following the bubonic plague for popula-
tion growth to resume its earlier trajectory.
The one billion mark for the human population 
was only reached in the early 19th century, 
with the year 1804 often given as an estimate 
of this milestone. The second billion came in 
1927, and the third already by 1960 after a 
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A constant struggle for survival led to virtually 
all traditional cultural value systems and reli-
gions placing a strong emphasis on reproduc-
tion to enhance population growth and avoid 
decline, as any meaningful influence society 
had over mortality levels remained beyond 
reach. In Abrahamic tradition, “be fruitful 
and multiply” was the essential command 
that God gave to Adam and Eve, according 
to the book Genesis, sentiments echoed by 
many other cultures.1 The value of greater 
population growth even included the realm of 
political power and governance, as written in 
the Bible’s Proverbs 14:28: “In the multitude 
of people is the king’s glory.” Roman philoso-
phers were of largely the same mindset, with 
many arguing in favor of early marriage, taxes 
for celibacy, and rewards for marriage and 
parenthood (Goswami, 1985). 
However, already in ancient Greece the 
philosopher Plato had speculated about an 
optimal population size, which implied that 
already there was a conception that there 
could be too many people as well as too few, 
depending on the circumstances. He suggest-
ed the ideal population size for a Greek city 
state would be at a constant level of 5,040 
households, mostly because the number 
is conveniently divisible by many numbers 
(including 12, which had a sacred dimension 
in ancient Greece), as well as this numerical 
limit helping people to capably perform their 
roles as citizens by knowing the community 
and avoiding anonymity.2 Debates on the rela-
tive merits of a small or large population were 
also being held in ancient China as far back as 
the 6th century B.C.E. (Xueyuan, 2019).
During most of the Middle Ages, when social 
phenomena were viewed in fatalistic terms 
and population growth was valued as a by-
product of nature, Henry IV of England made 
a famous statement connecting the viability 
1 For example, also in Hinduism, see Gudorf’s 
“Comparative Religious Ethics: Everyday Deci-
sions for Our Everyday Lives” as well as various 
cultures of Sub-Saharan Africa, see Manuh and 
Sutherland-Addy’s “Africa in Contemporary 
Perspective”. 
2 For more information, see Plato’s Laws. 
of the state to the well-being of those who 
live in the kingdom and the sheer size of the 
population: “The strength and riches of kings 
consist in the number and opulence of their 
subjects,” he supposedly said around the year 
1400 (Stangeland, 1904). Around the same 
time the Arab philosopher and historian Ibn 
Khaldun in Tunis wrote about the economic 
benefits of a growing population as it created 
the conditions for increasing specialization 
and division of labor, which in turn would lead 
to higher incomes.3
The connection between population growth 
and economy was also stressed by the 
Mercantilists in England, in particular John 
Graunt, William Petty, and Edmund Halley as 
well as Johann Peter Süssmilch in Prussia. 
These 17th century thinkers held the view 
that the nations strongest in people and 
material goods would survive and prevail over 
others. Quite specific policy recommendations 
flowed from this outlook, such as penalties 
for non-marriage, or limiting out-migration 
(except to their colonies). In 1662 John 
Graunt, who is sometimes called the father of 
demography, published the “Bills of Mortality” 
which are the first known statistical tables in 
demography. He famously showed that for 
every 100 children born in London only 16 
were still alive at age 36, and only 3 at age 66 
(Graunt, 1662). This extremely high level of 
mortality, seen from today’s perspective, also 
showed that the biggest potential for enhanc-
ing population growth was in the reduction of 
child mortality. This is what actually happened 
in the beginning of the demographic transition 
in the 19th century, but it was not considered 
as a viable option before modern medicine 
and hygiene, and therefore the discussion 
at the time of Graunt and the Mercantilists 
focused mostly on fertility.
Reproduction was also the main focus of Rob-
ert Malthus, who believed that human beings 
like plants or animals are “impelled” to grow 
by a powerful “instinct” until they are held 
back by certain limits. He saw the decisive 
limit to human population growth in the avail-
3  For more information, see Ibn Kaldun’s 
Al-Muqaddimah (“The Prologue”).
ability of food and what he called the means 
of subsistence. Malthus famously argued that 
while the population grows geometrically (ex-
ponentially) the food supply could only grow 
linearly due to limited availability of land and 
the diminishing returns to labor input. He thus 
predicted repeated famines that would stop 
population growth (positive checks) when 
growth would hit such limits. He did not over-
look the possibility of voluntary reductions in 
fertility (preventive checks) through celibacy 
or abstinence within marriage, though he 
considered this unrealistic because “the pas-
sion between the sexes will never diminish” 
(Malthus, 1798). 
This perspective on human nature and the 
inclinations for populations to grow has 
survived as a powerful narrative up to this day 
and has since found different expressions. It 
notably inspired the 1972 report “The Limits 
to Growth,” published by the Club of Rome 
(Meadows et al., 1972). This scientific report 
has had the highest number of published cop-
ies in history, and used computer simulation 
methods to put numbers on the Malthusian 
claims noted above, with the addition of oil 
supplies as a decisive limiting factor as well as 
the limited factor of food supply. In the same 
tradition, the two influential books “The Popu-
lation Bomb” and “The Population Explosion,” 
both by the biologist Paul Ehrlich (Ehrlich, 
1968; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1990) have greatly 
contributed to raising global political attention 
with respect to the potential dangers associ-
ated with rapid world population growth. In 
recent years this fear of population growth 
has been linked to directly contributing to 
greenhouse gas emissions, and making it 
more difficult to adapt to already unavoidable 
climate change (IPCC, 2014).
Notwithstanding these concerns about the 
dangers associated with rapid population 
growth, in the field of national politics a grow-
ing population continued to be mostly seen 
as something desirable. Changing population 
size at this level has always been closely 
linked to the perceived viability of states and 
their strength relative to neighboring popula-
tions, exemplified by the traditional Fran-
co-German struggle for influence and survival. 
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After French defeat in the 1870-1871 war, 
divergent demographic trends received much 
more attention, where the markedly lower 
French fertility in the preceding decades was 
linked to weakness on the battlefield. 
Even people of sharply different philosophical 
views at the time agreed on population mat-
ters. As expressed by demographer Arsène 
Dumont, “a nation must have a population 
dense enough to keep stable an equilibrium 
with her neighbors” (Dumont, as cited in Te-
itelbaum and Winter, 1985). Dumont sought 
balance to what he described as the growing 
unintended consequences of modern life on 
reproduction, known as “social capillarity,” or 
the limiting of fertility when it was advan-
tageous to climb the social ladders. “From 
the moment when the imagination and the 
attraction of the ideal enter the scene, we find 
ourselves in the presence of a new principle of 
population,” he argued as the trends marched 
on. Upon surveying the French census results 
in 1907, an unnamed German professor is 
reported to have said, “more coffins than 
cradles: this is the beginning of the end... 
Finis Galliae” (Savant, as cited in Teitelbaum 
and Winter, 1985). In the years that followed, 
these realizations gave birth to France’s 
demographic fears and cycles of pro-natal-
ism, a tradition that carries on in some form 
to this day and inspired the thinking in many 
countries beyond France.
The causes of contemporary population de-
clines, low fertility rates, and high out-migra-
tion are linked to a high degree of individual 
agency and is relatively new in the scope of 
human history. Rather than being determined 
more directly by nature or unavoidable events, 
these population declines flow from modern 
life and the broader passage of demographic 
behaviors – fertility, mortality, and migration 
– deeper into the sphere of personal control.
Demographic behaviors are 
still not simply “elective” or 
independent of outside influence, 
however. A number of competing 
responsibilities and barriers 
exist that discourage people 
from having the family sizes they 
reportedly desire, 2.2 children on 
average in Europe (OECD, 2016) 
and migration often involves an 
element of being pushed, out of 
economic necessity.  
Contemporary population change, to the 
extent it is driven by persistent transfers of 
people from one region to another, is perhaps 
the most consequential, long-term aspect 
of international relations. As the dynamic 
between countries is less rivalrous today in 
Europe than in the past, the conversation 
around migration is turning to one of exam-
ining imbalances and finding solidarity with 
the sending regions affected by population 
decline due to migration. 
Both the economic system and popular 
sentiment generally expect population growth 
to continue to occur, as it is a fixture in the 
psyche of modern society. This fixture has 
been influenced by the human experience 
especially over the last four decades of the 
20th century during which, indeed, the vast 
majority of countries in the world experienced 
rapid population growth. While a reckoning 
with the end of this larger 300-year-long trend 
is coming this century, Western Europe has 
at least temporarily avoided confronting this 
change through in-migration from its neigh-
bors as well as from other continents. This 
leaves other regions, such as the Balkans, as 
covered in this report, to be among the first 
group of countries (together with others in 
East Asia) to deal with modern “voluntary” 
depopulation. 
Simply taking a country’s current popula-
tion size as the norm is rather arbitrary, and 
unending population growth is, by definition, 
unsustainable. So, at some point, the slowing 
or ending of population growth is natural and 
to be expected (Lutz, Sanderson, and Scher-
bov, 2001). Still, there are multiple challenges 
associated with population decline, within 
certain bounds, given the causes behind it.
In this report we will address this issue from a 
multi-dimensional demographic perspective, 
which means that we will not only look at 
population size and age structure, but also 
differentiate by level of education and labor 
force participation. We expect smaller but 
higher-skilled societies across Europe, and as 
human resources grow more specialized and 
valuable there will be even more consequen-
tial competition for workers. 
If Western European countries 
that target the Balkans for 
migration do not pay greater 
attention to the impacts on the 
countries of origin, instead of 
being primarily driven by their 
own domestic labor market 
shortages, they risk undermining 
the long-term economic and 
social development of the Balkan 
region.  
In the following sections, the importance of 
human capital in the context of population 
decline and associated greater rates of aging 
will be discussed. 
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Demographic transition is the progression of 
demographic regimes, from the high birth and 
death rates of the pre-industrial era, to a mid-
dle-stage when death rates decline and spark 
rapid population growth until, finally, birth 
rates correspondingly decline and population 
growth moderates or ends. This transition, 
which earlier was also labelled as the “demo-
graphic revolution,” has been characterized 
as the transition from uncontrolled high levels 
of birth and death rates to a modern system of 
controlled and low levels of these rates (in the 
context of fertility, “controlled” refers essen-
tially to the reproductive behavior of individ-
uals/couples, while in the context of mortality 
it also has a strong public health component). 
Intermediate stages of the demographic tran-
sition – when death rates have already fallen 
while birth rates remain high – are associated 
with rapid natural population growth, where 
“natural” refers to the balance of births and 
deaths not considering out-migration, which 
in open populations is a third factor impacting 
population change.
While in the process of demographic transi-
tion, declines in mortality are almost always 
an object of universal aspiration but high fer-
tility norms are often deeply rooted within cul-
tures and typically take longer to correspond-
ingly adjust to any improvements in mortality. 
Only after (i) birth rates fall below the 
so-called “replacement level” of two surviving 
children per woman and (ii) a period of time 
passes when a young age structure results in 
an increase of women entering reproductive 
age (with a slowing of growth momentum over 
time) does population growth then eventually 
come to a halt. The precise timing of this 
process varies from one population to another 
also depending on trends in mortality. 
While in a few cases, such as historical 
France, the mortality and fertility declines 
happened only gradually and at about the 
same time, in most countries there was a dis-
tinct lag time of several decades between the 
two. In terms of what is generally agreed upon, 
the framework of the three basic precondi-
tions for a lasting fertility decline is widely 
accepted (Coale, 1973): 
1. Fertility must be within the calculus of 
conscious choice (at the level of women 
or couples), meaning it must move from 
the realm of fatalism to that of consciously 
planned behavior; 
2. Lower fertility must be advantageous; and 
3. There must be culturally acceptable 
means for preventing births. 
This framework effectively presents the idea 
that there is no single causation of fertility 
decline. Rather, the cognitive (education-re-
lated), economic (also urbanization-related), 
and contraception-related factors all need 
to come together. These pre-conditions were 
required in historical Europe to precipitate fer-
tility decline in the same way as they are still 
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required in today’s African countries seeking 
to moderate fertility and speed their process 
of demographic transition, and economic 
development.
Mortality rates have shown continuous 
improvements for the most part, but there 
have also been some notable discontinuities, 
such as the AIDS pandemic leading to signif-
icant falls in life expectancy in some African 
countries, or the deterioration of mortality 
conditions mostly among low educated men 
in some parts of the former Soviet Union. But 
in its generalized form, the process of the 
demographic transition is considered to be 
universal in modern history, and essentially 
irreversible. 
At the moment various populations around 
the world are at very different stages of this 
universal process of demographic transition. 
While the process was completed in Europe 
decades ago, it is now also complete in most 
countries in Asia and the Americas, but still 
underway in large parts of Africa, where most 
countries are still in the phase associated with 
rapid population growth. 
The striking contrast in 
demographic patterns currently 
observed in various parts 
of the world are essentially 
a consequence of different 
populations being at different 
stages of this universal process. 
The concept of demographic transition was 
originally triggered by the observation of de-
clining birth rates in many European countries 
over the first few decades of the 20th century. 
Demographers Warren Thompson (1929), 
Adolphe Landry (1934), and Frank Notestein 
The Final Phase of 
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(1945) were the first to classify countries 
into different stages of this universal process 
that brings countries from a condition of high 
birth and death rates to one that is ultimately 
characterized by low birth and death rates. In 
this early literature, the driver of this process 
was simply called “modernization” without a 
deeper specification in terms of the relevant 
causal mechanisms propelling these changes. 
But what they likely had in mind was general 
socioeconomic development as the reason for 
a decline in crude death rates (“CDR”) that 
was typically followed by a decline in crude 
birth rates (“CBR”) after a time-lag of varying 
length. As a consequence of the difference 
between the two, the rate of natural increase 
(“RNI”) of a population would rise for a period 
of time. Disregarding in- and out-migration, 
this difference is the reason for population 
growth in all populations around the world. 
Figure 1 illustrates this process for Finland, 
which has the world’s longest national-level 
demographic time series with annual data on 
death and birth rates since 1722. After strong 
fluctuations through the middle of the 19th 
century, the 1870s saw a lasting decline in 
death rates begin. By comparison, the birth 
rates in Finland only started a steeper decline 
around 1920. During this 50-year period, or 
the lag period, the population grew at around 
1.3%-1.4% per year. 
While initially just a description of the de-
mographic experience in today’s low fertility 
countries, the concept of the demographic 
transition has been further refined over the 
past few decades. The demographic transition 
has essentially become the basis for all 
international population projections, which 
uniformly assume that once the process of 
mortality decline has started, fertility decline 
will follow until a level around or below a 
replacement level is reached. The predictive 
power of the demographic transition justifies 
its characterization as a “theory” in the 
spirit of critical rationalism (Popper, 1959), 
although it has been criticized that the theory 
is still not specific enough in terms of which 
precise conditions mortality and fertility de-
clines occur in, and what impacts the speed 
of decline. 
A core component of demographic transition 
theory is also the prediction of its irreversibili-
ty, a hypothesis that has not yet been falsified 
by any population. Quite to the contrary, 
with respect to fertility there are examples of 
countries that after having gone through the 
fertility transition have fallen back into pover-
ty, such as the Republic of Moldova after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union (which became 
the poorest country in Europe with a GDP per 
person adjusted for purchasing power parity 
lower than countries such as Angola and Nige-
50
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Figure 1.
The Demographic Transition in 
Finland, with five-yearly averages 
of birth and death rates per 1000 
people from 1722-2017 in Finland 
(Lutz, 1987; and the public statics 
agency “Statistics Finland” for more 
recent years).

ria). Yet the fertility rate in Moldova has further 
declined to a level of 1.6 children per woman, 
as opposed to 5-6 in early demographic transi-
tion countries in Africa. In spite of a minor 
recovery, Moldova’s birth rate is unlikely to go 
back to pre-transition levels.
Changing marriage patterns and in particular 
the rise of non-marital unions together with 
value changes concerning sexuality and 
post-modern values in general have also been 
labeled a “Second Demographic Transition” 
by scholars Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa (Les-
thaeghe, 2010; Van de Kaa, 1987), because 
they saw view these social changes as the 
reason for a second wave of fertility decline 
that has brought fertility to below replacement 
levels.
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Uncharted Territory: Fertility 
and Mortality after the 
Demographic Transition
There is no widely shared, 
consistent theoretical framework 
for understanding how fertility 
and mortality levels develop once 
the demographic transition is 
completed. 
The intuition of many demographers and oth-
er analysts in terms of thinking about future 
fertility levels has been strongly influenced by 
the numerical values provided by the series of 
the widely used world population projections 
regularly produced by the UN Population 
Division since the 1960s. These projections 
reflected the dominant thinking at the time – 
that increases in life expectancy would level 
off with the survival curve becoming more 
and more rectangular but not shifting to the 
right and the fertility of all countries would 
converge to a “Total Fertility Rate” (or, “TFR”) 
of 2.1, the so-called replacement level of 
fertility, reflecting a new long-term equilibrium 
that would be reached. These assumptions, 
together with the assumption of a future of 
little to no international migration, resulted in 
a demographic outlook where in the long run, 
after having gone through the turmoil of de-
mographic transition, every population would 
be in a stable equilibrium with no countries 
shrinking or increasing. In the absence of any 
convincing alternative narrative about the 
future, this set of assumptions made sense 
and were also politically convenient in the 
context of the United Nations (“UN”) because 
no government needed to be afraid of a future 
in which their population would either shrink 
or grow indefinitely. 
However, in recent decades all three as-
sumptions that lead to this predicted stability 
proved to be wrong. Life expectancy in an 
increasing number of countries surpassed the 
previously assumed upper limits (Oeppen and 
Vaupel, 2002), while migration has contin-
ued and even increased over time in some 
regions. Additionally, fertility rates – which 
are the most influential drivers of long-term 
demographic trends – continued to fall below 
replacement level in almost every country that 
has reached that threshold. As discussed in 
Section VI, the replacement level of 2.1 is a 
theoretical construction, so it is unsurprising 
it has no analogue in the real trends of any 
Figure 2.
Trends in Total Fertility Rate 
(“TFR”) in different parts of 
Europe and the U.S. since 1980 
(VID and IIASA, 2020).

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country, which do not miraculously stop their 
decline once reaching replacement level 
of 2.1, or other. As a consequence, most 
international population projections now 
assume a convergence of fertility levels at 
a lower level, such as a TFR of around 1.85 
according to projections by the UN and the 
Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and 
Global Human Capital (the “Wittgenstein 
Centre”), a research institution focused on 
such topics (United Nations 2019; WIC 2019). 
A set of new global population projections 
published in July 2020 by the Institute for 
Health Metrics and Evaluation assumes that 
ultimate fertility levels will be much lower, 
settling around 1.3 in most countries by the 
end of the century (Vollset et al., 2020). But 
such alternative numbers for a long-term 
post-transition fertility level are as arbitrary as 
the choice of 2.1 because there is simply no 
theoretical or empirical basis for choosing an 
ultimate fertility level moving forward. 
An influential article in 2009, however, 
showed that for a certain time interval the TFR 
had a positive correlation with the Human 
Development Index (“HDI”), after reaching a 
minimum level (Myrskylä et al., 2009). This 
was taken as an indication that fertility would 
not stay at very low levels, but instead recover 
to some extent as social and economic devel-
opment progressed. But the experience over 
the last decade contradicts that assumption. 
South Korea, which showed the most rapid 
progress in socio-economic development, 
had further declining TFRs, which in 2018 
reached the lowest national level of any 
country at 0.98 children per woman and in 
2019 even further decreased to 0.92 children 
per woman. Some of the highly developed 
countries in Northern Europe that also used to 
have relatively high fertility, such as Finland 
and Norway, saw steep TFR declines over the 
past few years.
Figure 2 summarizes the most recent fertility 
trends in different parts of Europe and the 
United States. It clearly indicates a departure 
from the patterns of the early 2000s, when 
there seemed to be rather stable patterns of 
high fertility around 1.85 in Northern Europe 
and the US, and low fertility around 1.3-1.4 in 
the rest of Europe. There now appears to be 
some convergence in TFRs across this region 
to a level of around 1.5. This picture certainly 
does not confirm the view of a convergence 
around the higher rate of 1.85, which had 
been seen in the U.S. and Northern European 
countries. 
Given all these uncertainties and national 
differences in fertility levels, what then do we 
know about the likely long-term fertility levels 
at the end of demographic transition? A major 
effort to summarize the state of our knowl-
edge about the drivers of low fertility and 
future trends involving hundreds of population 
experts from around the world is reported 
in the work of Basten et al. (Basten et al., 
2014). It includes a detailed assessment of 
different arguments concerning the determi-
nants of fertility in such dissimilar domains as 
biomedicine and contraception, cultural and 
social forces shaping fertility ideas, norms 
and desires, changes in partnership and living 
arrangements, employment and the economy, 
education and finally the possible role of pol-
icies trying to directly or indirectly influence 
fertility. This last factor will be discussed in 
more detail in Section VI. The conclusions 
from this most comprehensive assessment 
was that fertility trends will likely continue to 
be context-dependent, implying that global 
convergence to any particular level is unlikely, 
but if such a level needs to be assumed for the 
purpose of producing population projections, 
it should be well below 2.1. For projections, an 
alternative to assuming one convergence level 
is to produce alternative scenarios reflecting 
plausible ranges of possible future trends and 
comparing the outcomes in terms of future 
population sizes. This approach will be taken 
for the projections presented in the next 
section, combining different fertility scenarios 
with different scenarios on future migration 
levels, which are even harder to forecast than 
fertility because of their greater volatility. 
At this point it is also appropriate to say 
a word about the possible impact of the 
COVID-19 crises on future mortality and fer-
tility trends. Several recent studies have mod-
elled how COVID-19 mortality could impact 
life expectancy as a function of the prevalence 
of the disease in the population, and the age 
structures of the populations at risk, since 
the virus affects older age-groups much more 
severely than younger ages (Marois, Muttarak, 
and Scherbov, 2020). Generally, the results 
show that for the year 2020, in countries with 
a COVID-19 prevalence below 1%, there will 
be hardly any visible effect on life expectancy. 
In the hardest hit regions of Europe, however, 
there could be short-term decline of some 
3-4 years of life expectancy on average, if no 
harvesting effect is assumed (i.e. if the people 
dying of COVID-19 would not have died 
anyhow from other causes over the course 
of the same year). To what degree there is 
such a harvesting effect can only be assessed 
retrospectively, 2-3 years in the future when 
we will have more detailed information. 
If there are no serious lasting health problems 
among those surviving a COVID-19 infection, 
then over the coming years the trend in life 
expectancy should revert back to its earlier 
tendency to increase, rather than decrease. 
One can even speculate that in highly devel-
oped countries the possible consequences 
of strong efforts to improve health systems 
and vaccination rates during the COVID-19 
crisis could even reinforce the likely future 
increases in life expectancy, contributing to 
longer term continued health outcomes. On 
the other hand, economic depression together 
with high unemployment could have serious 
psycho-social consequences that contribute 
to higher mortality, depending on the length 
and severity of the crisis. With respect to 
fertility, the impacts are even more specula-
tive. There may be two competing forces: one 
leading to higher fertility due to strengthening 
family bonds and more time spent together at 
home, and the other leading to lower fertility 
as a consequence of economic uncertainty 
and fears about the future. To see which of the 
effects dominates, we will have to be patient 
for at least nine months after the beginning of 
the lockdown efforts and review available data 
at that point in time.
There may be other lasting effects of 
COVID-19 on the social and economic de-
velopment of Serbia in particular, and other 
countries in the region, particularly in the field 
of migration and possibly on the education 
system, both relevant for an assessment of 
future human capital. Greater emphasis by 
countries on epidemiological safety and eco-
nomic recovery is likely to keep international 
travel and labor migration at lower levels, 
at least in the short-term. Initial political 
responses continue to evolve, but some have 
reflected a view that the COVID-19 outbreak 
and secondary effects will force a larger 
reassessment of how interconnected states 
remain, including migration regimes and the 
Schengen area in Europe. Although it is too 
early now to make definitive statements about 
such potential impacts, we will address some 
of these questions in the following sections.
The Final Phase of the Demographic Transition
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Migration is the third factor of population 
change in addition to fertility and mortality. 
Regardless of a birth deficit (i.e. more deaths 
than births) populations can either grow or re-
duce in size depending on migration rates. In 
Germany for example, the resident population 
has continued to expand in spite of natural 
conditions for it to reduce in number; this has 
been due to migration, with Germany promi-
nently taking migrants from other EU member 
states. It is hence interesting to disentangle 
the effects of natural population growth and of 
migration on future population size. 
Table 2 presents population comparisons and 
projections (both accounting for migration, 
and excluding migration) for all European 
countries as well as a number of East Asian 
countries which are also expected to shrink 
based on recent scenario projections by Euro-
pean Commission (“EC”) and the Internation-
al Association for Applied Systems Analysis 
(“IIASA”) (Lutz et al., 2018) (with Serbia and 
other neighboring Balkan countries high-
lighted in blue for effect). These results are 
derived from multi-dimensional demographic 
modelling techniques that take into account 
age, sex, education, and other characteristics, 
building on approaches used by the Centre 
of Expertise on Population and Migration 
(CEPAM), a joint research initiative of the EC’s 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) and IIASA. 
A comparison of the “medium assumption” 
scenario and the “medium assumption – zero 
migration” scenario (combined with medium 
fertility and mortality) shows that under the 
hypothetical assumption of no international 
migration, 23 of the current 27 member states 
of the European Union would have a lower 
population size in 2075 than today.
Migration, Aging, and 
National Population 
Dynamics
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Table 2.
Population size across countries  
(in the millions) (i) as of 2015, 
projections for countries’ 
populations in both  (ii) 2045 and 
(iii) 2075, according to a “medium 
assumptions” scenario (“SSP2”), 
and projections for countries’ 
populations in both (iv) 2045 and 
(v) 2075, assuming no inbound or 
outbound migration, with a focus on 
countries of East Asia and Europe, 
with Serbia and neighboring Balkan 
countries highlighted in blue
(WIC, 2019).  
Projections for Serbia were 
updated by Michaela Potančoková.

2015 2045 (Medium) 2075 (Medium) 2045 (Medium  – zero migration)
2075 (Medium  
– zero migration)
China 1,397.1 1,341.5 1,040.7 1,348.0 1,053.1
Japan 128.0 110.3 89.8 108.6 85.3
South Korea 50.6 49.8 39.8 49.5 38.8
Thailand 68.7 67.4 56.0 65.5 50.9
Vietnam 93.6 106.5 95.8 109.3 101.8
Albania 2.9 2.3 1.5 3.0 2.6
Austria 8.7 9.2 9.7 8.2 6.9
Belarus 9.5 8.6 8.0 8.4 7.1
Belgium 11.3 12.4 13.3 11.4 10.7
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.5 2.3 1.2 3.2 2.6
Bulgaria 7.2 5.3 3.7 5.9 4.8
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2015 2045 (Medium) 2075 (Medium) 2045 (Medium  – zero migration)
2075 (Medium  
– zero migration)
Croatia 4.2 3.7 3.2 3.7 3.2
Czechia 10.6 10.0 9.2 9.7 8.4
Denmark 5.7 6.2 6.8 5.8 5.8
Estonia 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0
Finland 5.5 5.6 5.8 5.5 5.5
France 64.5 72.8 80.0 68.3 68.5
Germany 81.7 80.5 80.4 72.7 60.5
Greece 11.2 11.0 10.6 10.3 8.6
Hungary 9.8 8.6 7.5 8.3 6.8
Iceland 0.33 0.39 0.42 0.39 0.41
Ireland 4.7 5.5 5.8 5.4 5.5
Italy 59.5 56.1 50.9 53.3 43.4
Latvia 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.4
Lithuania 2.9 2.4 1.9 2.6 2.2
Luxembourg 0.57 0.77 0.97 0.6 0.56
Montenegro 0.63 0.6 0.55 0.62 0.56
Netherlands 16.9 18.2 18.8 17.1 16.1
North Macedonia 2.1 1.8 1.4 2.0 1.8
Norway 5.2 6.2 7.2 5.7 5.8
Poland 38.3 34.5 28.8 35.5 30.7
Portugal 10.4 9.1 7.7 9.4 7.8
Moldova 4.1 3.6 2.9 3.7 3.0
Romania 19.9 15.4 10.5 17.3 14.0
Russia 143.9 134.2 129.4 126.0 108.3
Serbia  
(without Kosovo4) 6.9 5.6 4.4 6.0 5.1
Slovakia 5.4 5.0 4.3 5.1 4.5
Slovenia 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.6
Spain 46.4 4.8 46.9 43.5 35.9
Sweden 9.8 11.4 13.4 10.3 10.6
Switzerland 8.3 9.8 11.0 8.4 7.5
Ukraine 44.7 38.4 34.1 37.3 30.4
United Kingdom 65.4 73.3 80.0 69.2 69.0
4 References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
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This population decline results from the 
complex interactions of current age structures 
(resulting from past fertility, mortality, and 
migration trends), assumed further increases 
in life expectancy (contributing positively to 
population growth) and assumed fertility levels 
not so different from currently observed ones 
(contributing to long-term population decline). 
In the EU, only France, Ireland, Sweden, and 
Finland would experience modest population 
growth by 2075 under the scenario of no 
international migration. This is mostly due 
to a relatively higher level of current fertility, 
together with a somewhat younger current age 
structure. 
The broader pattern for European countries 
not in the EU is rather similar as those in the 
EU. All countries listed in Table 2 would be 
naturally shrinking without considering in- and 
out-migration, except for Iceland, Norway, 
and the UK. Many countries also would shrink 
under the assumption of a continuation of 
past in- and out-migration rates, which is 
the migration assumption in the “medium 
assumptions” scenario. For Serbia’s Balkan 
peers (highlighted in blue in Table 2), the 
gaps between the “medium assumptions” and 
“medium assumptions – zero migration” sce-
narios show how large the impact of out-mi-
gration becomes over time. Furthermore, 
unlike other major demographic events like 
births and deaths, out-migration is difficult to 
capture since emigrants often do not register 
when leaving the country. These population 
projections use official estimates, but they 
are in turn susceptible to under-reporting, 
particularly relevant for the high out-migration 
countries like those across the Balkans.
Serbia can expect a smaller, but 
better educated future population 
according to all the divergent 
scenarios explored in this 
study, in keeping with the broad 
direction of the other countries 
across Europe. 
However, depending on how and whether 
out-migration from Serbia to Western Europe 
reduces or accelerates over the coming years, 
the severity of Serbia’s population reduction 
could vary substantially. By 2050, this would 
mean a nearly 1,000,000 person difference 
between the high vs. low out-migration 
scenarios that assume a doubling of recent 
migration streams or, alternatively, zero future 
migration (calculated as extreme cases for 
sensitivity analysis) with otherwise equal 
assumptions on future fertility and mortality 
trajectories.
In the “medium assumptions” scenario, in- 
and out-migration rates are assumed to be 
constant at the levels observed over the past 
decades, but when the population base to 
which these constant rates are applied dimin-
ishes over time, this has a compounding effect 
and also results in declining absolute numbers 
of emigrants. This constant migration rate 
assumption is combined with relatively con-
stant future fertility at 1.6 children per woman 
in Serbia, and slowly improving mortality 
conditions, similar to conditions in other 
European countries. Under this “medium as-
sumptions” scenario the population of Serbia 
reaches 5.35M by 2050, or 28% less than the 
population today in 2020. This middle-of-the-
road “medium assumptions” scenario future 
falls between the “zero migration” scenario 
(resulting in a projected 5.87M in population 
by 2050) and the “double migration rates” 
scenario (resulting in a projected 4.89M in 
population by 2050).
Population Aging Ahead
In all cases modeled, the proportion of the 
population above age 65 in Serbia will be 
higher than today, growing from about 22% in 
2020 to nearly 33% by 2050 in the “medium 
assumptions” scenario. These aging trends 
are largely set. 
In the purely theoretical 
case where (i) fertility would 
immediately increase by 50 
percent – which would bring it 
closer to current desired family 
size (Živković et al., 2017) – and 
(ii) there would be no (zero) 
migration, the rate of population 
aging could be slowed by more 
than half. 
The increasing average age would only reach 
24% of the population being above the age of 
65 by 2050, mostly due to the change in birth 
rate (Lutz et al., 2019).
As described above, population aging in 
Serbia to some degree is inevitable regardless 
of the fertility or migration scenario, and is a 
product not only of past low fertility and high 
out-migration, as reflected in the current age 
structure of the country, but also successes in 
extending longevity. According to UN data, life 
expectancy at birth (for both sexes together) 
in Serbia has increased from 66.7 years in 
1956-70 to 75.8 years in 2015-20, thus in-
creasing life expectancy in the country by over 
9 extra years of life in the last five decades 
(UN, 2019). But population aging does not 
necessarily mean a growth in dependency if 
social policies like retirement are flexible and 
incentivize labor force participation, even in 
older years. Serbia’s educational attainment, 
a proxy for the skills and adaptability of a pop-
ulation, is expected to grow, with the propor-
tion of people holding post-secondary training 
or university degrees rising from 21% in 2015 
to nearly 33% by 2050 if trends continue.
Actually, this improvement in the educational 
attainment of the adult population is a near 
certainty: in Serbia – like in almost every oth-
er country – the younger cohorts are better 
educated than the older ones. As those better 
educated cohorts move up the age pyramids 
and the older, less-educated pass away (a 
process called demographic metabolism) the 
average education of the population improves, 
even if there would be some stagnation in the 
expansion of schooling and a country’s educa-
tion strategy. For example, if the COVID-19 
crisis would cause a serious interruption of the 
schooling system and that would lead to lower 
learning outcomes over 1-2 years, this new 
trend – if it cannot be compensated for while 
children are still of school age – would only 
translate into a slower increase (rather than a 
stagnation or a decrease) in human capital for 
the working age population, as it would slow 
but not overcome or reverse the broader mo-
mentum of educational attainment in Serbia.
A recent analysis in the trends of mean years 
of schooling (“MYS”) and skills-adjusted 
mean years of schooling (“SAMYS”) of the 
working age population for all countries in 
the world showed a rather favorable trend 
over the past few decades: while in 1990 the 
Serbian working age population had on aver-
age 9.91 years of schooling, this increased to 
11.16 years in 2000 and 12.06 years in 2015 
(Reiter et al., 2020). Based on actually-tested 
skills, the SAMYS increased even more rapidly 
from 9.10 years in 1990 to 12.14 years in 
2015. Hence, adults’ skills today are even 
slightly above today’s OECD average (by 0.1 
years) and increased over the past 25 years 
by the equivalent of more than three years of 
schooling. Similarly, the UN’s comprehensive 
index of various education measures shows a 
steady rise in Serbia’s development (UNDP, 
2020). Strategies for dealing with population 
aging and associated questions of economic 
dependency (which underscore the impor-
tance of human capital) are further covered in 
the next sections.
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Population aging and decline bring a set of 
clear macro-economic challenges. These 
relate most immediately to the balance of 
contributions and payments and the solvency 
of pension funds, health services, and other 
social policy programs. Such national pro-
grams tend to differ substantially from one 
country to another and a proper assessment 
of the resilience of the systems to specific 
demographic changes requires a detailed 
model for each specific system, which is typi-
cally only done within national social security 
administrations. For this reason, comparative 
international assessments of the economic 
burden of demographic changes tend to refer 
to more general ratios describing the relative 
sizes of segments of the population that con-
tribute to the system and those that benefit 
from the system. These ratios are usually 
called “demographic dependency ratios” and 
exist in several forms.
Conventionally, these demographic depen-
dency ratios simply involve the rather crude 
assumption that an individual’s contribution 
is entirely based on their age, i.e. that adults 
contribute up to age 65 and thereafter every-
body is considered a dependent. However, 
multiple factors including the changing nature 
of aging itself require an update as to how 
demographic change is considered. This has 
very real implications for whether ageing is 
seen as having serious economic consequenc-
es, or not. 
Use of chronological age to reflect 
economic dependency does not 
do justice to the present-day 
reality where “age 70 is the new 
60” – health and education levels 
among older persons have vastly 
increased, extending the older 
population’s productivity far 
beyond levels in the past. 
Often overlooked is the fact that even when 
older persons require care, delivery of such 
care is an economic activity, and contributes 
to the national economy in and of itself.
The simple age dependency ratio (the green 
line seen in Figure 3) is still frequently used, 
but in many cases paints a misleading picture. 
The projections on page 19 for five countries 
in and around the Balkan region illustrate this 
point. The results come from a micro-simula-
tion model recently published for all EU mem-
ber states (Marois, Bélanger, and Lutz, 2020). 
These calculations do not include Serbia but 
five other countries in the region and thus 
allow for some comparison against countries 
that share similar context with Serbia. As can 
be clearly seen, the age dependency ratio is 
expected to climb in all of these countries, un-
derpinning popular narratives and reporting of 
upcoming economic doom.For some of these 
countries, the age dependency ratio even 
increases to twice its current level by 2060. 
But these dramatic results obscure important 
nuances and hide an otherwise uplifting story.
Viewed over the past decades, not only are 
lifespans longer, but we are living more years 
in good health (rather than just living). This 
reality together with the changing role of wom-
en in society and the labor market is among 
other factors also reflected in labor partici-
pation rates, making the simple use of age as 
the sole indicator of productivity, harder to 
defend. As shown by the labor force depen-
dency ratio (the red line in Figure 3), when 
taking into account actual labor participation 
rather than using the crude assumption that 
participation and productive life ends at 65 
and everybody below age 65 participates in 
the labor market at the same rates, a large 
portion of the feared-increase in dependency 
never happens. This is due to improving par-
ticipation rates among the general population 
and particularly women, but also due to those 
at older ages.
It is not only for the reason of economic 
sustainability that labor participation should 
be encouraged even among older populations 
however, as studies show that well-being and 
connection with community are key benefits 
that people get from continuing to work in 
their later years. The precise definition of 
labor force participation differs by survey, 
in particular with respect to participation in 
informal work, which might have implications 
for pension systems depending on how they 
are structured. The European Labor Force 
(“ELF”) Surveys used for the projections in 
this section define workers broadly, consider-
ing everybody as part of the labor force who 
is either working for pay, self-employed, or 
looking for work. This however still does not 
include other types of work, for example, as 
many women perform work as mothers and 
caregivers, which is surely of great value to 
society and allow families to save on the cost 
of otherwise outsourcing some of these tasks.
Human Capital  
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With reference to the possible impacts of the 
current COVID-19 crisis, a lot depends on 
whether people still in the working ages will 
suffer lasting health consequences that will 
make them less productive. While it seems 
clear that in terms of mortality the highest 
age groups and people with already multiple 
health problems are most seriously affected 
by COVID-19, which would actually lower the 
dependency in the future due to the so-called 
harvesting effect, the degree to which working 
age people will be hampered in their produc-
tivity by the pandemic is not yet clear.
The productivity-weighted dependency ratio 
(the blue line in Figure 3) adds another layer 
of consideration to demographic dependency 
ratios. This ratio accounts for the fact that 
not all individuals are equally productive 
in society. This ratio uses the educational 
composition of the population as a proxy for 
productivity (measured by different wage 
levels for different educational attainment 
groups) and shows how trends suggest that 
there will be more economic output produced 
per worker, given the improving levels of 
completed education. 
While this effect may be diminished as the 
highest levels of education become less selec-
tive and pursued by a larger proportion of the 
population, making it less of a sorting mech-
anism at the higher end of the spectrum, ed-
ucation is importantly linked to adaptability, 
among other skills. Such skills are ever-valu-
able in the context of the changing nature 
of work (particularly with the onset of more 
remote work brought about by COVID-19), 
and the uncertainties that further automation 
and artificial intelligence might bring.
Lastly, the productivity-weighted dependency 
ratio - Swedish scenario (the dashed blue 
line in Figure 3) explores what demographic 
dependency would look like if these countries 
slowly converged with the highest participa-
tion rates for men and women that are seen 
in the European Union; those observed in 
Sweden today. 
In most cases, such improvements 
in labor participation would in 
fact mean a future reduction 
in dependency compared 
to today, the opposite of the 
prevailing expectations that 
an aging population will bring 
an overpowering drain on the 
economy over time.
Even if these Swedish-like levels are not 
reached, the purpose of this scenario is to 
illustrate the power of incentivizing labor 
participation as a strategy for avoiding 
aging-related economic declines. Successes 
in both labor participation and education, two 
critical factors for describing any population, 
imply that the feared rise in dependency from 
population aging is largely overstated.
The examples of these five countries in  
Figure 3 clearly show that the possible future 
economic burden of population aging that 
tends to come along with population decline 
very much depends on the perspective and 
the indicators taken. Whereas the convention-
al (and even old-school) age dependency ratio 
assumes that everybody above age 65 is a 
burden and shows very strong increases over 
the next four decades by over 80% in Croatia 
and Slovenia and over 60% in the other coun-
tries, the other more meaningful and nuanced 
indicators show much less of an increase of 
the economic burden of an aging population. 
Already considering the actual labor force 
participation rates in each country reduces 
the increase in the burden of nonworker to 
workers to around 20% in Hungary and Roma-
nia and around 30% in Bulgaria and Croatia 
(using the labor force dependency ratio). The 
outlook improves further when considering 
the fact that highly skilled people are on 
average more productive combined with the 
reality that the future labor force will be better 
educated than today (using the productivi-
ty-weighted dependency ratio). Additionally, 
if it is imagined that women in the countries 
covered in Figure 3 gradually start participat-
ing in the labor market to the same degree 
that Swedish women do today, and pension 
ages also approach those in Sweden today 
(the productivity-weighted dependency ratio 
– Swedish scenario), then the demographic 
burden of dependency would actually decline 
by about 20% in all countries except for Slove-
nia, where it would stay about constant.
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Figure 3.
Projected trends in different demographic dependency ratios (shown 
relative to their levels in 2015) addressing the economic burden on 
population ageing for selected countries in the region, 2015-2060 
(Marois, Bélanger, and Lutz, 2020).
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5 Serbia Amid High  
Out-Migration
Depopulation in Serbia comes from a specific 
mix of trends now common across Eastern 
Europe.
Many countries in the region have 
the low fertility rates typical of 
highly industrial countries, paired 
with the high out-migration often 
seen in lower-middle income 
countries.
This combination has made Serbia one of 
the fastest depopulating countries in the 
world. In earlier times, such as during World 
War I, Serbia suffered immense casualties 
– by many estimates Serbs had the highest 
proportional losses of the war with about 16% 
of the population or 1.25M dead (Keegan, 
1998; Radivojevic and Penev, 2014). The 
historical depopulation was different from 
today not only because it was the result of 
conflict, but also because at the time the Serb 
population could at least “rebound” in some 
sense given the country’s high fertility rates. 
By contrast, Serbia had only 1.49 children 
per woman in 2018. If Serbia’s 21st century 
depopulation trend is to be moderated, then 
it will be critical to guarantee practical and 
reliable policy support for families as well as 
reduce the deeply felt economic and cultural 
push-factors contributing to high rates of 
out-migration.
Definitive statistics on out-migration, and 
by extension net migration, are difficult to 
come by for the whole of the Balkan region. 
A recent investigation into the data (which 
labeled the task a “statistical nightmare,”) 
found that approximately 60,000 people 
leave Serbia each year, with about 15,000 to 
20,000 more leaving each year than returning 
(Judah, 2019). The OECD estimates more 
than 650,000 people, mostly young, have left 
Serbia in the last two decades (OECD 2020). 
While the scale of movement varies, observers 
and international organizations widely look to 
the future with expectations of continued high 
out-migration in Serbia. Figure 4 details pop-
ulation projections for the “medium assump-
tion” scenario, in which current trends largely 
continue. As outlined in earlier sections, 
Serbia can expect a smaller, better educated 
population in the future.
Serbia’s combination of an educated popula-
tion and the country’s close proximity to Eu-
ropean economies wanting their labor make 
it difficult for the country to build up human 
capital. As measured by the World Econom-
ic Forum,5 the ability of Serbia to retain its 
talent or prevent “brain drain” currently ranks 
among the worst of all countries, within and 
outside the region, placing Serbia 134 out of 
137 countries included in the assessment. 
Peers in the region, like Croatia, Romania, and 
Bulgaria, fare similarly poorly as they continue 
to struggle with the same westward migration 
outflows, which in some cases have acceler-
ated as a natural result of being integrated 
into the European single market while also 
being at clearly different levels of economic 
strength.. Many Eastern European countries 
have seen a spike in out-migration after their 
accession to the European Union, and out-mi-
gration remains higher in newly acceded 
countries than their levels before joining, but 
it is unclear at what new levels they might 
eventually stabilize.
5 For more information, see The World Economic 
Forum, “Executive opinion Survey, Appendix C,” 
available at http://reports.weforum.org/ 
global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/ 
competitiveness-rankings/#series=EOSQ399.
These experiences give a sobering reason to 
put out-migration among the highest of pri-
orities in discussions about EU membership 
and national planning efforts, as this type of 
out-migration acceleration would likely repeat 
itself in Serbia if Serbia gets closer to (and 
eventually attains) EU membership status. 
Surveys indicated that in the minds of Serbs, 
EU membership is now closely associated 
with the facilitation of individuals to move 
away (Regional Cooperation Council, 2018). 
The consequential nature of this issue calls 
on Serbian leadership to proactively reduce 
migration push-factor pressures before 
accession, yet still, most of the out-migration 
dynamics would inevitably be set by the west-
ern countries and the reality of the current 
single market policy framework. Even amid 
COVID-19, Balkan-focused migration policies 
in prominent destination countries like Ger-
many have been publicly stated to be based 
on the interests of the German labor market 
(rather than the interests of Balkan countries’ 
human capital development). 
In response, the European Union 
should provide convincing 
strategies for avoiding large 
unintended out-migrations as 
part of their ongoing outreach to 
the Western Balkans, as the talks 
often blur the distinction between 
a freedom to move and in-effect 
promotion of the outflows of 
people from these countries.
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Figure 4.
Serbia’s population pyramids by age, sex 
and level of education in 2015 and 2060 
(WIC, 2019).
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Who is leaving, and why?
Data shows that in terms of human capital 
composition, out-migration in Serbia has been 
disproportionately concentrated among the 
high-skilled and low-skilled workers, as shown 
in Figure 5 This pattern may be self-reinforc-
ing because low and high-skilled workers have 
an economic complementarity that can be 
disturbed. The movement of highly educated 
people, in particular, the phenomenon known 
as “brain drain,” is commonly discussed with 
hopes for these workers’ return, or a “brain 
circulation”, that brings the most educated 
and skilled people and their human capital 
back to their home country. This ideal remains 
rather theoretical, however, as most of the 
emigrants from Eastern Europe have stayed 
in their destination countries (Atoyan et 
al., 2016). Furthermore, the contemporary 
trends in emigrant skill composition that is 
seen in many Western Balkan countries stand 
in contrast to trends from earlier decades. 
During the 1970s there was a significant wave 
of about 1.3M Yugoslavs, many of them Serbs, 
who left as guest workers heading especial-
ly for Germany, Austria, and Switzerland 
(Bernard, 2012). These workers were used 
for relatively menial jobs in their destina-
tion countries. Today however, a significant 
proportion of Serbian emigrants carry with 
them more years of schooling, a product 
of overall educational attainment rising in 
the country, with migration becoming more 
education-selective within the population in 
Serbia. Furthermore, many of these emigrants 
are deciding not to return, in a break with past 
tendencies.
The reasons behind the outflows of migration 
in Serbia in current times are primarily eco-
nomic, but also cultural to a degree. Surveys 
have found that when asked, roughly a quar-
ter to a third of respondents express a desire 
to leave the country (Simić, 2018; Regional 
Cooperation Council, 2018). Students are 
even more likely to hold such sentiments, with 
as many as 60% indicating so in one public 
opinion survey on youth migration (Bjelotom-
ic, 2018). Actual realized migration is natural-
ly much lower, but these sentiments are in line 
with widespread unhappiness with the general 
economic, social, and political situation in the 
country. A study by the Government of Serbia 
(the “government” or “GoS”) confirms this, 
finding that the main push-factors for Serbian 
students to leave are the inability to find a job 
in their field (27%), low incomes (21%), and 
low living standards (29%) (Government of 
Serbia, 2018). Objective material standards 
have increased for Serbs in recent decades, 
as in almost all countries, but what is consid-
ered to be normal is often more a question of 
relative wealth and expectations, meaning in 
the case of Serbia the relative wealth expec-
tations are comparisons against its neighbors 
and Western European economies.
Besides the economic drivers, a common 
theme throughout Eastern Europe is the 
equivocation between going abroad and 
success. Serbia is no exception in this regard. 
“Staying here is what young people would 
call ‘a loser’s move’,” said one Serbian social 
psychologist in a media report on the topic, 
a trend confirmed by a broad media review 
in which the author summarized popular 
thinking as, “get out of Serbia for a better life” 
(Simić, 2018; Brezjanović-Shogren, 2019). 
These blunt characterizations sum up an 
uninspired narrative of the future that has 
persisted in Serbian culture, and is accompa-
nied by parental support for young peoples’ 
decision to leave 90% of the time (Govern-
ment of Serbia, 2018). Both migration and 
fertility decisions involve a calculation about 
the future and rely on a general optimism 
that is lacking not only in Serbia, but in many 
European societies today.
While Serbian emigrants can give concrete 
examples of migration push- and pull-factors 
at work, returnees offer insights into what at-
tracts people to build lives at home in Serbia. 
Returnees, a self-selected group who have 
often achieved some financial success, cite as 
motivations to come back a feeling of belong-
ing, family ties, day-to-day comforts, and even 
prospects for giving their children a better 
childhood in Serbia than where they had lived 
abroad (Brezjanović-Shogren, 2019). Inter-
estingly, the perception of quality of life was 
found to change with experience in Western 
Europe and North America, as Serbian return-
ees seemingly changed from placing highest 
value on better pay and material success that 
compelled them to leave, to instead stressing 
intangible cultural factors that drew them to 
return home. This finding seems to support 
the idea that once basic economic security is 
met, many people would naturally prefer to 
pursue options other than out-migration if not 
otherwise feeling compelled to do so out of 
financial necessity.
What’s at stake?
In terms of impacts on the labor force, the 
food and hospitality, wood, and transportation 
sectors are some of those left understaffed 
that are in need of more workers in Serbia. For 
the higher-skilled workforce, a large num-
ber are composed of medical professionals 
and IT specialists. Serbia produces more 
health workers than the OECD-average, but 
the majority of current medical doctors are 
considering leaving and there is already a 
lack of necessary specialists in some health 
sectors (Institute for Public Health of Serbia, 
2015). Serbia’s youth-concentrated “brain 
drain,” especially in the science, technology, 
and innovation sectors, results in a loss to the 
country of around 1.2B Euro each year (WFD 
and IDI, 2019). Looking at the broader Central 
and Eastern European (“CEE”) region, the 
IMF found that emigration from 1995–2012 
equated to cumulative real GDP losses of 7% 
on average for countries in the region, and in 
spite of remittances’ effect on investment and 
consumption, emigration broadly reduced pri-
vate sector activity, external competitiveness, 
and general productivity (Atoyan et al., 2016).
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Overall, these impacts underscore 
what is at stake when the 
education system – the primary 
skills-forming institution in 
society – does not adequately align 
itself with needs of the economy 
and people are left without 
fulfilling and experience-relevant 
channels to make a living.
Such coordination is done to varying degrees 
across Europe, but it is those countries like 
Serbia with already high out-migration that 
can least afford the consequences of not 
highly coordinating and aligning the education 
sector to the job market. Any possible alloca-
tion of study spots or funding configurations 
for educational programs inherently require 
such calculations about the future.
It is too early to say what the consequences 
of the COVID-19 crisis may be on migration 
patterns in Serbia. There is preliminary 
information that around 400,000 Serbs living 
outside the country came back to Serbia 
in March 2020, just before borders were 
closed. If accurate, this would be a signif-
icant proportion of the Serbian diaspora 
returning home. But at this stage it is unclear 
whether these individuals will mostly return 
to their earlier workplaces outside Serbia or 
a sizeable proportion of them will stay home 
in Serbia for longer. In any case, this could 
be an opportunity for the government to 
produce incentives and make attractive offers 
for them to stay in Serbia rather than leave 
the country again. Government initiatives to 
support returnees could include a number of 
efforts focused on maintaining diaspora ties, 
hosting virtual job fairs and lowering admin-
istrative burdens of return. However, these 
efforts cannot substitute fixing the underlying 
causes driving people out of Serbia. To help 
solve the disconnect between years spent in 
education and the lack of available jobs that 
feed resentment and pessimism among youth 
particularly in Serbia, the Serbian government 
has among other initiatives started promoting 
dual education, which brings companies into 
the educational and training process, as well 
as forming sectoral skill councils focused 
on employment fields (Vasić, 2019). These 
actions are a healthy and necessary devel-
opment, and if successful in streamlining 
the transition from student to worker, should 
be expanded throughout the vocational and 
university systems.
Simulations for Serbia and the European 
Union confirm that to deal with the future 
demographic changes of depopulation and 
aging, improving labor participation is key 
(Kupiszewski, Kupiszewska, and Nikitovic, 
2012; Lutz et al., 2019). Automation and 
increased worker productivity offer additional 
strategies to thrive with a smaller labor force. 
To harness human capital and maximize re-
turns, it is in the interest of Serbia to continue 
to further its efforts to consciously and flexibly 
manage its education system to be responsive 
to labor market needs, which works against 
the current skills mismatch and is a source of 
common frustration that could be mediated 
by providing viable paths for Serbs to find 
experience-relevant livelihoods and build 
fulfilling futures.
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6 Pro-Natal Policies in 
Europe 
As recently as the 1980s, Serbia had a birth 
rate at replacement level. By 2018, the birth 
rate stood around 1.49 children per woman, 
indicating a variety of economic and cultural 
changes that have since prioritized other 
pursuits. Low fertility levels have concerned 
national governments at least since the Fran-
co-German conflict in the 1870s, as described 
in the historical section. Once fertility levels 
in several European cities and among specific 
ethnic sub-populations fell below the replace-
ment level of two surviving children per wom-
an in the 1920s and early 1930s, there was 
another wave of concern about the assumed 
negative consequences of low fertility. Shifting 
national power balances and economics drove 
the renewed focus on low fertility during and 
after this time period, with policies attempting 
to counteract the trend finding very different 
expressions in a variety of countries.
In Sweden the famous pro-natal population 
policies go back to Gunnar and Alva Myrd-
al’s work in the 1930s, which pointed to the 
fertility-enhancing effect of a welfare state 
that incentivizes women to both participate 
in the workforce and also raise children, 
which at the time was a rather radical view. 
A more authoritarian approach was taken 
by Nazi Germany, which gave strong moral 
and material support to families with many 
children, with an explicit emphasis on the 
benefits this was providing for the German 
nation. After World War II, partly because of 
the excesses these policies were taken to in 
Germany, in most countries the special fertil-
ity-enhancing policies were no longer high on 
the policy agenda (except for France, where 
pro-natalism was in fact strengthened). In 
the aftermath of World War II these countries 
experienced the post-war baby boom, which 
in the U.S. and many European countries 
brought fertility rates up to three or more chil-
dren per woman on average. This baby boom 
resulted from a combination of growth in early 
marriage (thus ending the previous “Europe-
an marriage pattern” characterized by late 
marriage and high proportions of people never 
marrying) together with economic growth and 
widespread optimism about the future.
During the 1970s many European countries 
then experienced rather sharp declines in 
fertility rates. Because this decline coincided 
with the introduction and broad use of the 
hormonal contraceptive pill, this decline was 
even labelled the “Pillenknick” (meaning a 
bend in the birth rate resulting from the pill) in 
German-speaking countries. But the pill was 
only a more effective method of contraception 
than previous, and not the underlying reason 
for the decline fertility rates which instead 
resulted from social and normative changes 
as discussed in the section on demographic 
transitions. Already in 1978, an important 
book published by the Council of Europe, 
“Population Decline in Europe,” described the 
social changes unfolding (Council of Europe, 
1978).
An interesting quasi-natural experiment in 
pro-natal policy can be tested by the com-
parison of the two German states, east and 
west, split by the iron curtain. Up until around 
1974, the two states shared the same steep 
decline in fertility rates until the East German 
government decided to implement strong 
countermeasures, whereas no new specific 
pro-natal policies were introduced in the West 
(Büttner and Lutz, 1990). 
East German fertility recovered 
sharply, whereas fertility 
continued to fall in West Germany. 
The East’s effective policies 
explicitly removed a barrier to 
family life, which had been an 
acute housing shortage for young 
couples (and those looking to start 
families).
Every woman got privileged government 
supported housing with the new reforms as 
soon as she was pregnant, even irrespective 
of her marital status. Together with generous 
financial support and childcare facilities, 
these policies helped to turn around the de-
cline in fertility in East Germany. Interestingly, 
many female university students also decided 
to have at least one child early on, contrary to 
the general trend in industrialized societies, 
presumably in order to benefit from these sup-
port measures. As a heritage of this pattern, 
even after German unification, women in the 
Eastern part of Germany continued to have 
their children much earlier than in the West.
In more recent decades, an increasing 
number of governments have tried to raise 
fertility rates from below replacement fertility 
through various forms of family-related poli-
cies. This increase in attention at the level of 
national leadership is documented by regular 
surveys taken by the Population Division of 
the UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs. This data shows that the share of 
countries in the world stating that they have 
explicitly pro-natal policies has risen from 
10% in 1976 to 15% in 2001, and up to 28% 
by 2015. Such policies range from direct 
pro-natalist campaigns to softer regulations 
that try to help people to balance work and 
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family life and have the number of children 
that they consider personally ideal. A key 
differentiating characteristic of policies across 
countries is whether they emphasize general 
financial assistance, mandated flexibility to 
take parental leave after childbirth, or the 
provision of childcare facilities. There is no 
clear evidence of cross-national convergence 
in such policies. Different mixes of these three 
policy instruments are rooted in welfare state 
histories as well as different attitudes towards 
families and the role that governments should 
play in influencing such personal decisions.
In terms of the scientific literature studying 
the effectiveness of pro-natal policies, there 
have been several attempts to summarize the 
experiences and the effects of such policies 
on the level of fertility in different countries. 
Among the mixed cases, not all of the imple-
mented policies have achieved the intended 
changes in the conditions under which young 
women and men decide to start their families 
or extend them, and not all changes in these 
conditions actually resulted in changes in 
observed fertility rates. Gauthier concluded 
from a comprehensive survey of many such 
policies and their effects that the evidence of 
family policies on fertility trends is inconclu-
sive (Gauthier, 2007).
Luci-Greulich and Thevenon studied the 
experience of 18 OECD member countries 
over the period from 1980 to 2007. Due to 
the fact that the early 2000s were a period of 
increasing TFRs (total fertility rates) in many 
rich countries, this study aimed at assessing 
the role of different policies in what they called 
the “recent fertility rebound” (Luci-Greulich 
and Thevenon, 2013). Their results show that 
all instruments of family policy (paid leave, 
childcare services, and financial transfers) 
had positive influences on fertility. Comparing 
the different interventions, they found that 
both in-cash benefits during childhood and 
childcare services had bigger impacts than 
leave entitlements or benefits granted around 
childbirth. 
Findings on the most effective 
pro-natal policies suggest that 
parents have a longer time horizon 
in mind and calculate about that 
the anticipated stability and 
persistence of such policies when 
making fertility decisions. . 
Changing such policies every election cycle or 
otherwise not guaranteeing their durability un-
dermines the confidence of would-be parents 
in such support mechanisms.
Another very recent comparative study also 
takes the latest TFR declines in several indus-
trialized countries into account (Stone, 2020). 
With a specific view towards the U.S., the asks 
what the U.S. can learn from the experience of 
other countries, mostly in Europe. It compares 
the experiences of Poland and Hungary as 
prominent examples of large-scale public 
efforts to boost the birth rate. Studying short-
term trends in CBR (the crude birth rate) it 
shows that in Poland, the birth rate increased 
rather quickly after the policy initiatives by 
some 10% before falling to a level that was 
still 6% higher than prior to such policies. In 
Hungary, on the other hand, different but 
equally ambitious efforts have resulted in a 2% 
short-term increase followed by a decrease, 
falling to below the initial CBR levels before 
such policies were put in place. One problem 
the author speculates in the study is that 
the Hungarian system is designed to heavily 
encourage larger families, in particular for cou-
ples to have a 3rd child (or more). Still, at only 
a couple of years old, it is too early to judge the 
long-term success of these ambitious initiatives 
and results may change.
In the study described above, Stone also pro-
vides a meta-analysis of 34 academic studies 
since 2000 assessing the effectiveness of spe-
cific pro-natal policies, 22 of which contain 
sufficiently detailed analysis of the policies’ 
effects to be used to estimate how fertility can 
be influenced by various pro-natal incentives 
(Stone, 2020). The results show that an 
increase in the present value of child benefits, 
equal to 10% of a household’s income, can be 
expected to produce between 0.5% and 4.1% 
higher birth rates. In summary, the study finds 
that more financial support does yield more 
children, but it takes substantial funding. Or 
in other words, trying to boost fertility rates 
to replacement levels, purely through cash 
incentives, is prohibitively expensive.
More fundamentally, what is the goal of fertility 
policies? Technically, replacement fertility is 
defined as the level of fertility by which one 
generation of women is fully replaced by an-
other. In practical terms this is often approxi-
mated by a TFR of 2.1 (which is slightly above 
two per woman, to adjust for child mortality 
and the sex ratio at birth). In high mortality 
settings a replacement fertility rate TFR can 
even be as high as 2.4-2.5, and in very low 
mortality settings it can be as low as below 
2.1. But replacement level fertility does not 
necessarily mean that the population size is 
constant in the longer run. This is only the case 
when the effect of the starting age structure 
(the momentum of population growth) has 
disappeared and there is no migration and no 
further changes in mortality or life expectancy. 
Since no real population has these features, 
replacement fertility is really a very abstract 
concept in the context of stationary popula-
tion theory – one that has escaped the lab of 
technical demographers and influenced the 
thinking of many people who do not really un-
derstand the implications or relying on these 
measurements which are ill-suited for features 
of the real world.
Discussion of fertility  
indicators – which is best to 
rely on?
Different fertility indicators can tell very differ-
ent stories. When trying to assess the question 
as to whether fertility levels should be seen as 
too low and whether certain policy measures 
actually influence fertility trends, it is of great 
importance which indicator is being used.
Up until the 1980s the most frequently used 
indicator was also the most easily available 
– CBR, which simply states the number of 
births in a given country divided by the total 
population of this country. But this indicator 
is unsatisfactory for several reasons, mostly 
because it is greatly dependent on the age 
structure of a specific population. In a country 
with a high proportion of women in repro-
ductive age, the CBR can be higher than in 
another country with fewer women in that age 
group, even though the number of children 
per woman might actually be higher in the 
latter. This fact greatly limits the comparability 
of CBRs across countries and over time. To 
avoid this problem, TFR indicator instead uses 
the sum of all the age-specific fertility rates 
observed in one country in a given calendar 
year, thus eliminating the misleading effect of 
differing age structures across countries and 
over time.
The TFR is the currently most frequently used 
indicator and can be interpreted as the mean 
number of children a cohort of women would 
have if, at a given age, they experience the 
age-specific fertility rates observed in this cal-
endar year. This hypothetical cohort of women 
is sometimes also called a synthetic cohort 
because in reality, no group of women actually 
pursues such a set of constant fertility rates. 
But more recent research has shown that TFR 
has another problem, in that it is very sen-
sitive to distortions caused by the changing 
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timing of fertility (called the “tempo effect”). 
Specifically, even minor changes in the mean 
age of childbearing have significant impacts 
on the TFR – for example, if 10% of women 
decide to postpone their births a year into 
the future, the TFR for the current year will 
be 10% lower, even if women have the same 
number of children by age 45. Meanwhile, the 
mean age of childbearing would only increase 
by a tenth of a year.
The impact of these timing, or “tempo,” 
distortions on the TFR indicator is illustrated 
in the case of another Eastern European 
country, the Czech Republic in Figure 6 
above. While the TFR was rather stable, at 
a comparably high level, until the country’s 
transformation in 1990, it entered a precip-
itous decline falling from around 1.9 to less 
than 1.2 by 1996 and staying at this very low 
level until 2003. As the figure illustrates, this 
steep decline in the TFR was associated with 
a rather strong increase in the mean age of 
first birth. Since 2004, the TFR has recovered 
to its current 1.7 and the increase in the age 
at first birth has largely stopped. Similar pat-
terns have been observed in many European 
countries. However, the recent recoveries are 
very dependent on the technicalities of the 
measure of fertility and are often hastily inter-
preted by national governments as successes 
of their respective policies aimed at higher 
fertility.
Do these trends in TFR tell the right story in 
terms of the “quantum” of fertility, or the un-
distorted level of fertility or the actual number 
of children women on average have over the 
course of their lives? The best measure clearly 
would be completed cohort fertility. This 
ultimate number of children that women had 
over their lives can, however, only be assessed 
once a female cohort has completed its child-
bearing, which in practical terms requires 
waiting until age 45-50. For the impatient 
observer, this is usually too long a period of 
waiting to understand the impact of certain 
policies on fertility, in particular since most 
of the children of this cohort will have already 
been adults by the time the cohort is “com-
pleted,” born 20-25 years prior. An effective 
and relatively new approximation of the 
ultimate, true level of fertility using contempo-
rary information is called the “adjusted TFR,” 
which is designed to eliminate the distortions 
due to tempo effects and changes in the 
parity distribution (Bongaarts and Sobotka, 
2012). This adjusted TFR is shown as the 
orange line in Figure 6 above. For the Czech 
Republic, with some minor fluctuations, there 
was an almost linear decline in the quantum 
of fertility from the 1980s to the more recent 
years. There is neither a precipitous decline 
nor a spectacular recovery, as implied by the 
TFR. This also indicates that claims that cer-
tain policies having led to higher fertility levels 
in this case would, at best, be valid in terms of 
slowing the increase in the mean age at births 
without influencing the quantum of fertility.
Figure 7 shows comparable graph to Figure 6 
but for Russia, which is probably the most 
prominent case of robust pro-natal policies 
in recent years in Europe. The pattern in 
Russia is actually quite similar to that in the 
Czech Republic, with Russia experiencing a 
precipitous decline in TFR from more than 2.0 
to less than 1.2 associated with the political, 
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economic, and social upheaval during the 
1990s. In Russia, the increase in birth rates 
has been correlated with quite significant 
pro-natal measures and is widely interpreted 
as evidence that such policies indeed work if 
they are generous enough. The TFR in Russia 
reached a level of almost 1.8 in 2016, though 
was most recently followed by a regression 
of TFR back down to 1.5 in recent years. The 
orange line in Figure 7 giving the “adjusted 
TFR” again shows much less fluctuation 
when relying on the “adjusted” methodology, 
although unlike the Czech Republic there was 
a real increase in the estimated quantum of 
fertility in Russia between 2005 and 2016. 
Whether or not this higher fertility will contin-
ue its momentum will be shown by the data 
over the coming few years.
But beyond these technicalities, is it really 
desirable for all populations to aim for the 
stationary effect that is implied by maintain-
ing replacement-level fertility? A study has 
systematically addressed this question by 
asking what the “optimal” fertility level is, ac-
cording to different sets of criteria (Striessnig 
and Lutz, 2013). If the goal is for a country to 
outnumber its neighbors then the “optimum” 
level of fertility is tied to the competing group. 
And if the neighbors have the same goal, then 
the search for an optimum fertility level can 
become an unsustainable arms race. If, on the 
other extreme, the goal is to minimize the hu-
man footprint on this planet without attaching 
special value to human life – as is suggested 
by proponents of strong sustainability mea-
sures – then the “optimum” fertility might be 
as low as zero.
If indicators of human well-being and the cost 
of population aging are taken as criteria, and 
if the population is stratified by education 
groups to account for differential productively, 
then there is a rather broad long-term “op-
timum” TFR range, from 1.5-1.8 (Striessnig 
and Lutz, 2013). From this perspective, the 
optimum TFR may be below 2.0 because with 
fewer children, more can be invested in each 
child, thus enhancing productivity. But below 
1.5 the cost of aging and associated pensions 
would offset this benefit in this economic 
weighing of costs and benefits, and there are 
surely tipping points along the way between 
1.5 and 2.0 where economies of scale are 
lost and the broader economy becomes less 
productive. If other considerations like natural 
resource degradation or climate change are 
added into the equation then the “optimum” 
would be arguably lower, depending on local 
conditions and the weight that longer-term 
environmental concerns are given in relation 
to shorter-term economic concerns. Still, un-
less we become immortal or migration inflows 
for a given country become never-ending, at 
some point (at least over several centuries) 
any population that does not reproduce itself 
eventually disappears. 
In the timeframe of policy-making 
and the plannable, what should 
be considered as an optimal level 
of fertility is a matter of values, 
judgement, and priorities – 
whether that means below, at, or 
above a replacement level TFR  
of 2.1.
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7 Economic and Geopolitical Consequences of  
Population Decline
In the economic literature a lot has been 
written about the economic consequences of 
population aging, but much less so on pop-
ulation decline and depopulation associated 
with strong out-migration (possibly because it 
has not yet affected the countries in which the 
leading economists are based). But it is rea-
sonable to assume that the economic effects 
of declines in population size go beyond those 
associated with population aging, through 
lesser economies of scale in terms of market 
size or certain sectors of the economy that 
are closely linked to an increasing population, 
such as the construction industry.
Since economists often tend to think in terms 
of equilibria, their first approach would be 
to view population decline as just a transi-
tory phenomenon up until a new stationary 
population is reached. However, the process 
of shrinking may lead (a) to significant societal 
adjustment costs during the transition from 
larger to smaller population numbers, (b) a 
change in the distribution of the population 
as well as a change in the distribution of 
outcomes (wellbeing) across sub-popula-
tions, and (c) possibly different long-term 
outcomes in terms of economic performance 
and wellbeing depending on how the process 
is shaped by policy-making (e.g. the extent to 
which the shrinking of the labor force can be 
counteracted by investments in education or 
other positive productivity gains).
In trying to address more systematically the 
possible economic challenges associated with 
population shrinking one can first think in 
terms of undesirable imbalances arising in the 
process.6 The first imbalance refers to aging, 
which is typically associated with population 
shrinking. This in turn is creating the well-
known problem of a (possible) increase in 
economic dependency due to the older, more 
dependent population. The policy challenge 
is to offset this by ensuring human capital in-
vestments, besides increases in female labor 
force participation and raising the retirement 
age.
A second possible imbalance lies in the geo-
graphical distribution of the population, since 
in many empirically observed cases of pop-
ulation shrinking there is a tendency for the 
population to cluster in agglomerations, which 
implies: (a) regionally differentiated processes 
of localized shrinkage (or even growth) of 
populations, which are typically characterized 
by strong inter-regional migration within the 
country; (b) cross-regional gradients (often an 
urban-rural gradient) in terms of the scope or 
needs for policy-making or even the direction 
of policy-making (for example, policy needs 
for the housing market, calling for expansion 
in agglomerations, but for “downsizing” in ru-
ral areas and minor towns). In addition, there 
are cross-regional patterns of behaviors and 
attitudes, as well as spillovers (for example, 
with respect to all the incentives that govern 
migration); and (c) population sorting (for 
example, the young and educated moving 
into agglomerations, leaving the old and 
lesser-skilled behind), which is a particular 
challenge in cross-regional migration (and 
may reinforce cross-regional imbalances).
6  This section benefited greatly from scientific 
input from Michael Kuhn.
Finally, in terms of aggregate economic 
activity, population shrinking (all else equal) 
will typically reduce total GDP or lead to lower 
aggregate growth in a country. However, 
unless pure size of a population is one of 
the most important factors (for example, for 
defense, or the ability to undertake large-
scale investments in infrastructure), the focus 
should be on per capita values because this is 
what matters for the economic well-being of 
people. Interestingly, lower population growth 
is traditionally perceived as beneficial for per 
capita income. The reasoning for this is weak-
er capital dilution: less investment is needed 
to equip new workers with capital (and there-
by maintain the capital stock per capita) so 
that a given volume of savings can be invested 
to increase the capital stock per worker 
and, thus, raise labor productivity. Lower 
population growth can bring other economic 
benefits in terms of higher female labor force 
participation, the quality-quantity trade-off as 
a facilitator of human capital investment, and 
the weakening of congestion effects (related 
to common infrastructure, the environment, 
etc.). But there are also possible offsetting 
effects that negatively influence per capita in-
come in the event of lower population growth: 
scale effects (or reverse scale effects) of a 
dwindling population can lead to reductions in 
specialization and slower innovation, as well 
as imbalances in the supply and demand for 
labor leading to mismatch and possible brain-
drain effects (in open economies), especially 
if there is selective migration.
While this list of possible economic implica-
tions of population shrinking is only a summa-
ry from the state of the economics literature, 
this list also presents a research agenda for 
deeper and empirical analysis of the various 
different mechanisms at work that can have 
offsetting effects in competing directions. In 
other words, from a theoretical point of view 
29
it is not clear at all whether the economic 
effects of population shrinking are on balance 
positive or negative. 
The policy challenge is, thus, to 
contain the potential negative 
side-effects of population 
shrinking by ensuring adequate 
investments into education or 
health, so as to raise the human 
capital per worker by enough to 
offset through productivity gains a 
potential reduction in the number 
of workers.
Investment into the automation of labor offers 
another management strategy to produce 
more output with fewer workers, prospects 
being pursued by many advanced economies.
Aside from possible economic impacts of pop-
ulation decline there are also widely discussed 
geopolitical implications from the shifts in 
relative population sizes due to rapid growth 
in some parts of the world – in particular in 
Africa – combined with declines in other parts 
(such as countries in Europe). But as we have 
discussed in the introduction and illustrated 
in several other sections, it is less so the head-
count that matters, but rather what is inside 
the heads that matter most, i.e. human capital 
mostly in the form of education and skills. 
Figure 8 below shows the trends in four world 
regions of populations by level of educational 
attainment, with reconstructed data back to 
1950 and projections according to the “me-
dium assumption” scenarios from the most 
recent population scenarios produced by joint 
efforts of the EC and the Wittgenstein Centre 
(WIC, 2019).
Figure 8 contrasts the two European regions 
(East and West, using the UN regional defini-
tions) with relatively stable population sizes 
against the rapidly growing continents of Asia 
and Africa. While the population of Eastern 
Europe (including Russia) is clearly on a de-
clining trajectory in terms of total population 
(from over 300M around 2000 down to less 
than 250M projected by 2075), the popula-
tion with post-secondary education is quite 
strongly expanding to almost 100M. Given 
the overriding importance of human capital 
discussed earlier, this is actually a quite 
promising future trend and looks certainly 
much less negative than the total population 
numbers alone would imply through a focus 
on shrinkage.
In Western Europe the trend is not so differ-
ent, with the difference of some further pro-
jected population growth, mostly due to the 
assumption of continued migration inflows. 
The projected expansion of the population 
with post-secondary education is more rapid 
in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe 
due to stronger recent investments in higher 
education, if trends continue. But there is no 
reason why Eastern Europe could not try to 
also pick up speed in its future education ex-
pansion, and already the ratio of non-workers 
to workers in Eastern European countries is 
often at a more favorable balance compared 
to Western Europe.
In Figure 8, Asia is clearly the most populous 
continent with current population levels of 
4.6B people, which is almost 60% of the world 
population. But fertility trends in most Asian 
countries – in particular in China – have seen 
a very rapid decline and therefore Asia’s total 
population is expected to peak around 2050, 
at somewhat more than 5B people, though 
the highly-educated population will continue 
to grow. Considering that in 1950 still more 
than half of the adult population of Asia had 
no formal schooling at all (the red area in 
Figure 8), it is remarkable that today more 
than half have secondary school education 
(meaning they have completed at least junior 
secondary schooling) or higher education.
Africa’s population is likely to still more than 
double from its current 1.3B to around 2.8B 
by 2075. But in Africa today, still a third of 
the entire adult population has no formal 
education at all, and the proportion with 
post-secondary education is marginal. In the 
theoretical case of current trends continu-
ing for the next decades, Africa would take 
decades to catch up with where Asia is today 
in terms of education levels, and only by the 
end of the time horizon in 2075 would its 
education levels be comparable to those of 
Eastern Europe today. Geopolitical changes 
will depend heavily on the human capital 
and associated economic performance of 
countries and world regions. In this respect, 
education-specific population projections 
reveal a relatively advantageous position for 
highly developed countries compared to the 
future that trends in future population size 
alone may imply when viewed in isolation.
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During the second half of the 20th century 
(at least up through 1994) the dominant 
population policy paradigm, supported by 
strong donor agencies, focused on curb-
ing rapid population growth in developing 
countries through family planning. There 
were also dissenting voices to this paradigm, 
mostly from socialist countries at the time, 
that pointed at the importance of population 
growth for social and economic development. 
In the 1980s the view that population was a 
neutral factor with respect to development 
also became a popular belief. The begin-
ning of the new century has seen increasing 
differentiation, if not confusion, about the goal 
of population policies and the appropriate 
instruments for pursuing them. While before 
1994, fears relating to population growth in 
developing countries dominated discussions 
in international fora, some forms of pro-na-
talism have always existed and shaped the 
policies of certain countries, though they had 
distinctly specific national perspectives. The 
1994 International Conference on Population 
and Development (“ICPD”) in Cairo codified 
a major shift away from demographic targets 
to a focus on individual reproductive and 
human rights. While important from a human 
rights perspective, this shift also resulted in 
generally less attention given to aggregate 
population-level considerations. There now 
remains a vacuum with respect to population 
policies addressing populations in the proper 
meaning of the word, as aggregates of people 
whose changing size and composition is 
consequential for the well-being of individuals 
and societies alike.
Today, governments of an increasing number 
of countries, whose low fertility levels and rap-
idly aging populations cause serious concern, 
are actively searching for policy interventions 
that are both effective at the population level 
and socially acceptable at the individual level. 
This issue is exacerbated in countries like Ser-
bia that experience significant out-migration 
and thus lose people and their skills to other 
countries that pay higher wages. It is this 
combination of negative natural growth (the 
balance of births and deaths) and significant 
out-migration that makes depopulation a hot 
issue of highest policy concern in the coun-
tries affected by these phenomena.
What would be an appropriate population 
policy paradigm that could effectively address 
these concerns of depopulation and at the 
same time also be applicable more broadly to 
other countries that are still at earlier phases 
of their demographic transitions? In an article 
entitled “A Population Policy Rationale for 
the Twenty-First Century” it was suggested 
the goal of population policies ought to be 
to strengthen the human resource base for 
national development as well as global sus-
tainable development (Lutz, 2014). Popula-
tion policies with this purpose can be viewed 
as “public human resource management,” 
to stress an analogy that is widely under-
stood among the private sector. Under this 
approach no certain population size, specific 
growth rate, set fertility rate, or a particular 
age structure is viewed as a goal in its own 
right. Within the human rights framework, 
population policies should – rather than 
achieve what could be arbitrary targets – try 
instead to efficiently and flexibly manage 
our public human resources to achieve the 
highest long-term well-being of current and 
future generations.
Comprehensive Policy 
Responses: Strengthening the 
National Human Resource Base 
Similar to a big company that 
tries to train its employees and 
retain the talent it employs, a 
national government should also 
have consistent and coherent 
strategies in education as a way to 
help its people establish satisfying 
working lives and build up the 
human resource base of their 
country.
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The instruments for pursuing such aims 
involve a broad range, from family and social 
security policies, to education and health pol-
icies, to migration and labor market policies. 
Education in particular, as the most important 
state institution for preparing young people, 
should prioritize giving the next generation the 
skills (quality and type) a country needs from 
its labor force for meeting its collective needs, 
both to the benefit of individuals and the 
country as a whole. Such policies to limit gaps 
in skills should involve several of the existing 
ministries which typically work in isolation on 
specific sectors rather than feeling respon-
sible for cross-cutting collaboration to jointly 
address the different aspects of human re-
sources. It might even be worth thinking about 
the creation of a new coordinating agency (or 
new ministry) directly reporting to the Prime 
Minister that would oversee the synergistic 
collaboration of public efforts to this end. 
Comprehensively addressing the challenge of 
public human resource management can help 
to integrate the often-separate policy areas 
into one overarching policy to the benefit of 
each country, its economy, and its population.
For highly developed countries, a lack of coor-
dination on these matters and resulting labor 
shortages often mean that labor migration 
policies compete against the goals of inter-
national aid or regional development, all of 
which are expressed by the same government. 
As a matter of good practice and to avoid 
these disconnects, there should be explicit 
consideration of how relevant policy decisions 
impact the human capital resources of the 
countries of origin in the case of high out-mi-
gration areas. Already in the 1970s these 
concerns sparked heated discussion at the 
UN after economists Bhagwati and Dellalfar 
proposed a tax on professional and technical 
emigrants from developing countries to help 
repay the communities for their consuming of 
the developing country’s limited educational 
resources, and transferrance of this “wealth” 
and the unrealized contributions they were 
expected to make in the richer countries 
rather than their home country (Bhagwati and 
Dellalfar, 1973). This was seen as adminis-
tratively and even more so politically difficult 
to implement, but it is not without precedent 
that a country requires a tax relationship 
with its citizens abroad, as for example the 
U.S. today requires of its citizens working 
abroad. While Bhagwati and Dellalfar’s direct 
correction of externalities focused on the in-
dividual who had benefited from a developing 
country’s investment in them, later variations 
of the proposal dealt with the topic at the 
country-level, requiring the active recognition 
of the problem by governments and potential-
ly uncomfortable changes on the part of the 
highly developed countries.
In Europe specifically, there is much talk of 
solidarity, which perhaps in its most agreeable 
form can be defined as pursuing mutually 
beneficial interactions of countries between 
and among each other. 
To the extent that indifference, 
active recruiting, and policy 
frameworks fuel the persistent 
out-migration – especially of 
highly educated individuals 
– from more economically 
vulnerable and depopulating 
neighbors, it should raise 
questions of solidarity.
This is perhaps easiest to understand and less 
abstract when the outflows get dramatic, as 
in the case of Romania losing approximately 
50% of its medical doctors to its fellow EU 
Members over the last 10 years. A domino 
effect has ensued as Moldova lost similar 
proportions of its medical doctors to Romania, 
with the poorest most often paying the price 
in the end. For what is sometimes talked 
about as a force of nature, these outflows 
are inevitably partial products of political deci-
sions or indecision in both the sending and 
receiving countries. Besides the self-interest 
countries have for crafting coherent national 
human capital management strategies with 
the purpose of meeting their needs, it is also a 
matter of acting responsibly for those leaders 
in the international community.
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